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Articles
Finding Balance, Forging a Legacy:
Harassers’ Rights and Employer Best
Practices in the Era of MeToo*
By RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN**
IT HAS BEEN TWO YEARS since news of serial sexual misconduct by
Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein triggered the social media phe-
nomenon that became MeToo.1 While new allegations continue to
* The Jack Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice
** Chauncey Wilson Memorial Research Professor & Director, Workplace Law
Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Rutgers University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; LL.M., Temple Law School. I am grateful to the University of San
Francisco Law School, its law review, and its outstanding employment law faculty for
honoring me with the opportunity to deliver the 2019 Jack Pemberton Lecture. Special
thanks to Professors Jessica Clarke, Tristin Green, Maria Ontiveros, Nantiya Ruan, and
Michelle Travis for their thoughts, feedback and encouragement on this project. Thank
you to the students in Denver Law’s fall 2019 Labor & Employment Law Writing Seminar,
where I workshopped this Article prior to publication. This publication would not have
been possible without the diligent research assistance of Denver Law students and
graduates Jessica Chao, Kellie Jenkins, and J. Kirk McGill. Special thanks to Kirk McGill for
unearthing the complete, authenticated copy of Harvey Weinstein’s contract on which I
base so much of this Article.
1. On October 5, 2017, the New York Times broke the news of multiple allegations
of sexual assault and harassment levied against Mirimax founder and Weinstein Company
co-chairman Harvey Weinstein, which were perpetrated over the course of decades. Jodi
Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-
harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/K6EA-BDD5]. On October 15, 2017, ac-
tress Alyssa Milano triggered an outpouring of responses when she tweeted that anyone
who had experienced sexual harassment or assault should reply “me too” to her tweet.
Mary Pflum, A Year Ago, Alyssa Milano Started a Conversation About #MeToo. These Women
Replied, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/year-ago-
alyssa-milano-started-conversation-about-metoo-these-women-n920246 [https://perma.cc/
8V7C-Q6PA]. Ms. Milano credited Tarana Burke, who in 2007 used “Me Too” as the slogan
for her non-profit organization that assists sexual abuse victims. Sandra E. Garcia, The Wo-
man Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/
K9RU-R7W4].
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surface,2 the pace has slowed since the winter of 2018, when rapid-fire
accuations against celebrities and other public figures were a near
daily occurrence.3 Now it is time to shift from the conscience wran-
gling that characterized the height of the movement to a more delib-
erative conversation about best practices going forward. It is time to
consider the legacy of MeToo.
That legacy will be defined in large part by the wave of reform
surrounding harassment prevention and the institutional handling of
complaints. A driving force is the groundswell of state legislative ac-
tion responding to MeToo, including laws mandating employer-pro-
vided training,4 limiting confidential settlements,5 and broadening
the definition of sexual harassment.6 But voluntary employer action is
an equal, if not more critical, component. Since MeToo, companies
2. High-profile personalities implicated in the last year include musician R.J. Kelly,
former CBS CEO and chairman Les Moonves, and opera star Placido Domingo. See
Michael Cooper, Pla´cido Domingo Leaves Los Angeles Opera Amid Sex Harassment Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/arts/music/placido-dom-
ingo-la-opera-sexual-harassment.html?module=inline [http://perma.cc/X7US-TVV2];
Elizabeth A. Harris, R. Kelly Charged With 10 Counts of Sexual Abuse in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/arts/music/r-kelly-charged-in
dicted.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/XLP5-MNPA]; Ronan Farrow, Les
Moonves and CBS Face Allegations of Sexual Misconduct, NEW YORKER (Aug. 8, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/06/les-moonves-and-cbs-face-allegations-of-sexu
al-misconduct [https://perma.cc/8CK7-6K2H].
3. From November 2017 through February 2018, The New York Times catalogued
seventy-one terminations and resignations related to allegations of sexual misconduct, as
well as twenty-eight other instances of alleged harassers facing suspensions and other disci-
plinary measures. See Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Mis-
conduct and Their Fall From Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html?mtrref=unde
fined [https://perma.cc/Q8VE-RNFA].
4. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-g(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through L.2019, Ch. 31,
50–59); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 79 of the 2019
First Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through
Ch. 5 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
5. See, e.g, H.B. 2020, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1001 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 651 of 2019 Reg. Sess.); A.B. A626 (N.Y. 2019); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.210 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). In addition, Con-
gress amended the tax code to bar employers from deducting payments or attorneys’ fees
incurred in sexual harassment or abuse settlements that contain nondisclosure agree-
ments. 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(q)(1) (2012).
6. See, e.g., CAL GOV’T CODE § 12923(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 524 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.) (providing that a “single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable
issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(h)
(West, Westlaw through L.2019 Ch. 360) (effective November 18, 2019) (prohibiting an
employer from subjecting any individual to harassment because of the individual’s mem-
bership in a protected category “regardless of whether such harassment would be consid-
ered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims”).
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have sought to improve sexual harassment policies and training,7 di-
aled back on the use of mandatory arbitration agreements,8 and re-
newed efforts to recruit and promote women.9 Perhaps most visibly,
many organizations have acted to promptly terminate or publicly dis-
tance themselves from accused harassers.10
7. See Tracey Breeden, Driving Change—Expanding Our Commitment to Help End Global
Sexual Assault and Gender-Based Violence, UBER (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.uber.com/
newsroom/driving-more-change/ [https://perma.cc/BF3L-WT3Z] (detailing specialized
sexual harassment training for Uber’s customer service representatives and product en-
hancements focused on providing safer rides for Uber passengers); Kate Conger & Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy After Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/technology/google-arbitration-
sexual-harassment.html [ https://perma.cc/5TLS-JYZ9] (describing improvements to sex-
ual harassment policies such as performance penalties for employees who fail to complete
preventative training); 5-Star Promise, AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N (Sept. 6, 2018), https://
www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/5Star_PR_Brand.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9HA9-U35B]
(detailing safety committments adopted by hotel chains such as the Hilton, Hyatt, and
Marriott International to protect employees from sexual assault and related risks); Jodi
Kantor, #MeToo Called for an Overhaul: Are Workplaces Really Changing?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/us/sexual-harassment-workplace-re
sponse.html [https://perma.cc/X4LA-VCT4] (describing increased attention to sexual
harassment prevention in a variety of market sectors from service industry employers to
investment agencies).
8. See e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/
uber-sex-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/JP2U-77QL]; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration in Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/technology/facebook-arbitration-harass
ment.html [https://perma.cc/4ZJJ-67QF]; Angela Morris, Why 3 BigLaw Firms Ended Use of
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, ABA J. (June 1, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/biglaw_mandatory_arbitration_clauses [https://perma.cc/6S33-J4TM].
9. At least fifty-four of the accused harassers who resigned or were ousted from high-
level positions as a result of the MeToo movement have been replaced by women. See Au-
drey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements
Are Women, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/
23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/9L2K-D8A7].
10. See, e.g., Keach Hagey & Joe Flint, CBS Chief Leslie Moonves Steps Down Amid Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cbs-ceo-
leslie-moonves-expected-to-resign-1536525335 [https://perma.cc/LN7U-9UTA] (CBS
CEO Les Moonves removed following New Yorker article detailing history of assault and
harassment); Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Is Fired After Sexual Harassment Reports, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/harvey-weinstein-
fired.html [https://perma.cc/C5DM-A6BV] (Weinstein fired two days after allegations of
sexual misconduct arose); Brooks Barnes, The Race to Erase Kevin Spacey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/movies/kevin-spacey-all-the-money-in-
the-world-christopher-plummer.html [https://perma.cc/7BHZ-PQ6M] (Kevin Spacey re-
placed in otherwise complete film after news broke about his sexual misconduct); Chris
Kirkham et al., Steve Wynn Steps Down as Wynn Resorts CEO, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2018) https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/steve-wynn-to-step-down-as-wynn-resorts-ceo-1517972210?mod=arti
cle_inline [https://perma.cc/4GMQ-6WWF] (Steve Wynn ousted following Wall Street
Journal investigative report on history of sexual misconduct). See generally Lesley Wexler et
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These developments are encouraging and essential, but they are
also concerning. Employers wield incredible power over their employ-
ees, including accused harassers. Many are principally motivated by
their own business interests, notwithstanding whatever concerns they
may have about injustice, and they do not necessarily have an in-
formed understanding of what sexual harassment is or how perpetra-
tors should be penalized.11 As I have argued elsewhere, employers are
likely to make two mistakes in handling accusations of harassment:12
(1) they are likely to aggressively police sexualized behavior by rank-
and-file employees,13 and (2) they are likely to simultaneously exercise
unwarranted restraint in the face of serial misconduct by the “top
dogs” of the workplace.14
These tendencies jeopardize MeToo’s legacy. Long-term success
in eradicating sexual harassment depends on companies’ willingness
to permanently reject the culture of silence that has insulated top dog
harassers from the consequences of their actions.15 It also depends on
employers’ ability to calibrate their response to alleged harassment by
less powerful workers. Strict enforcement of an overly broad anti-sex
al., #MeToo, Time’s Up and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 51, 53–54 (2019) (noting a
number of highly publicized examples of prompt and severe reprecussions for individuals
accused of sexual harassment).
11. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC
CIVIL RIGHTS 33–37 (2016) (describing the “managerialization of law,” whereby employers
respond to legal mandates by implementing compliance measures in ways that advance
managerial interests); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2087–88
(2003) [hereinafter Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace] (describing how employers have lever-
aged sexual harassment law to tamp down on personal expression, advance productivity
goals, and provide justification for eliminating out-of-favor employees).
12. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-Will
World, 128 YALE L.J. F. 85, 87 (2018) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process].
13. See id. at 95 (describing the problem of the “powerless” harasser).
14. See id. at 92 (describing contractual protections for “top dogs” or high-level em-
ployees). I draw extensively on this article throughout what follows.
15. The MeToo movement revealed instances in which corporate insiders knew of
high-level harassment, failed to stop it, and sometimes helped to conceal the problem. See
Kate O’Keeffe & Alexandra Berzon, Wynn Resort Executives Tried to Hide Misconduct Allega-
tions Against Steve Wynn, Regulators Say, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/massachusetts-regulators-release-report-on-investigation-of-wynn-resorts-11554211
385 [https://perma.cc/T3GV-MQJ7] (detailing how executives at Wynn Resorts knew
about Wynn’s sexual misconduct as early as 2009); Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill
O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-fox
-news.html [https://perma.cc/H5J8-5J73] (noting the company’s decades-long support for
O’Reilly despite on-going sexual harassment allegations).
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norm can undercut the movement’s credibility,16 discourage victims
from reporting,17 and most pernicious of all, deter men in power
from providing the mentoring and professional support women need
to achieve true equality.18
In short, the stakes are high, and the task is tricky. Employers
need help—from academics, advocates, and others with expertise re-
garding sexual harassment and gender discrimination—and that help
must come quickly. Employers are sexual harassment’s “first respond-
ers.” Their real-time reactions have an immediate impact and can de-
velop into permanent institutional practices well before emerging
legal initiatives come to fruition or can be tested in court.19 Employ-
ers, and indeed the public at large, need a better understanding of
the law of sexual harassment, its purpose and scope, the risks it poses
16. See Jesse Singal, For #MeToo to Work, We Must Draw the Line Between Sexual Assault
and Being a Jerk, REASON (July 9, 2018), https://reason.com/2018/07/09/for-metoo-to-
work-we-must-draw-the-line/ [https://perma.cc/Y6N8-3PHH].
17. See Nicole Porter, The Perils of Reporting Harassment, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49,
59–60 (2018) (drawing connection between zero tolerance policies, retaliation, and under-
reporting of harassment).
18. One-third of executives surveyed by the Society for Human Resource Manage-
ment (“SHRM”) reported changing their behavior toward female colleagues post-MeToo,
including by avoiding work interactions with female colleagues. Gillian Tan & Katia Porze-
canski, Wall Street Rule for the #MeToo Era: Avoid Women at All Cost, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/a-wall-street-rule-for-the-
metoo-era-avoid-women-at-all-cost [https://perma.cc/B6BR-S37Q]. Another survey, con-
ducted by LeanIn.Org, revealed that sixty percent of male managers say they are uncom-
fortable participating in common job-related activities with women, up from forty-six
percent prior to MeToo. See Sheryl Sandberg & Marc Pritchard, The Number of Men Who Are
Uncomfortable Mentoring Women Is Growing, FORTUNE (May 17, 2019), http://fortune.com/
2019/05/17/sheryl-sandberg-lean-in-me-too/ [https://perma.cc/EXC7-4Q4S]; see also
Katherine Tarbox, Is #MeToo Backlash Hurting Women’s Opportunities in Finance?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/is-metoo-backlash-hurting-womens-oppor
tunities-in-finance [https://perma.cc/F57F-JGKQ] (describing the growing reluctance of
men to hire, supervise or mentor women in the finance industry). Such actions could
constitute gender discrimination in their own right, although violations could be difficult
to capture under existing law. But see Anthony Michael Kreis, Defensive Glass Ceilings, 88
GEO.WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that employment practices that en-
courage or support men distancing themselves from female employees reflect ambivalent
sexism and are actionable under Title VII).
19. According to Professor Lauren Edelman, in the face of legal uncertainty, compa-
nies will create and implement practices consistent with their managerial interests that
then influence the development of the law, reifying their chosen practices. See EDELMAN,
supra note 11, at 39–40 (describing the pheonomen of “legal endogeneity” where judges
rely on employers’ adoption of “symbolic” compliance measures without regard to their
effectiveness). For a useful summary of Edelman’s work on the “managerialization of law,”
including its application to employers’ use of sexual harassment training, see JoAnna Suri-
ani, Note, “Reasonable Care To Prevent And Correct”: Examining The Role of Training in Work-
place Harassment Law, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 822 (2018).
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to rank-and-file employees accused of harassment, and the imperative
of removing legal and institutional obstacles to high-level
accountability.
This Article begins that process. Part I dispels common miscon-
ceptions about sexual harassment and employment rights generally. It
explains how the public’s conflation of sex with sexual harassment,
combined with the absence of worker due process protections, has
laid the groundwork for employer overreach. Part II unpacks the legal
and business incentives that deter employers from being equally vigi-
lant against top dog harassers as they are among the rank-and-file.
Using text from Weinstein’s final employment contract, this Part also
reveals precisely how organizations insulate top dogs against the con-
sequences of sexual harassment and how their contracting practices
must change to ensure accountability at the top of the corporate hier-
archy. Part III proposes best practices for handling accused harassers
and considers the potential for voluntary reform within organizations.
It argues that effective and sustainable change requires better educa-
tion about sexual harassment, ongoing scrutiny of corporate behavior,
continued solidarity with harassment victims, and a clear roadmap for
employers who choose to be at the forefront of this issue.
I. Is MeToo Too Much?
The prevailing response to the MeToo movement has rightfully
been one of empathy and support. The public has expressed solidarity
with victims, championed their cause, and demanded corrective ac-
tion by institutions and accountability from their leaders. But the
movement has also spawned concern about potential overreach. In
the public discourse, this has taken the form of questions about so-
called “due process” for harassers,20 culminating most spectacularly in
the judicial confirmation hearings of now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh.21
20. See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin & Joel Cohen, After #MeToo, We Can’t Ditch Due Process,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/
metoo-due-process-televictions [https://perma.cc/8CA6-GQJB]; Michel Martin & Eliza-
beth Foley, What Kind of Due Process are Those Accused of Sexual Misconduct Entitled To?, NPR
(Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/22/573046500/what-kind-of-due-process-
are-those-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-entitled-to [https://perma.cc/B3WH-3CGJ]. See
generally Jessica Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, U. CHI. L. F. (forthcoming 2019) (describing
backlash against the movement stemming from fears that accusations of sexual misconduct
have been insufficiently vetted).
21. Key senators based the decision to confirm then-Judge Kavanaugh on their belief
that the evidence was insufficient to prove he had sexually assaulted Dr. Christine Blasey
Ford, per her testimony before the Senate. Susan Collins’s Speech Declaring Support for Brett
Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/us/politics
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In legal and academic circles it has generated renewed attention to
the definition of sexual harassment and the nature of the underlying
harm. Such thinkers seek to reorient the conversation toward broader
goals of gender equity.
Fueling both strands of this collective unease is an issue of first
principles and a core challenge: how to develop best practices that will
balance the goals of victim protection and gender equity with fair
treatment for those accused. Finding an acceptable equilibrium re-
quires first and foremost a broader understanding of the baseline
rights on both sides of the equation. As discussed below, the public
has overstated the baseline rights of both harassment victims and al-
leged perpetrators, leading to legitimate but misplaced fears about
the dangers of the movement. A first step toward achieving best prac-
tices is correcting those errors.
A. It’s About Sexism, Not Sex22
It is impossible to solve a problem that one does not understand.
The MeToo movement has conflated the problem of sexual harass-
ment with that of unwanted sexualized behavior. At times the conver-
sation has converged with the long-standing conversation on sexual
predation, “date rape,” and consent.23 While this is a positive develop-
/susan-collins-speech-brett-kavanaugh.html [https://perma.cc/X6HW-X9XX] (citing
“fundamental legal principles [including] due process, the presumption of innocence, and
fairness” in announcing vote to confirm). See also The Kavanaugh Report: Reactions from Sena-
tors on the Right and Left, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/
04/us/politics/fbi-report-kavanaugh-senators.html [https://perma.cc/7MDT-W53P]
(quoting Senator Mitch McConnell invoking the principle of “innocent until proven
guilty” and cautioning the Senate against “set[ting] a fundamentally un-American prece-
dent” should it fail to confirm Kavanaugh based on Ford’s allegations); Ella Nilsen, Sen. Jeff
Flake Will Vote to Confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, VOX (Sept. 28, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/2018/9/28/17913660/jeff-flake-confirmation-vote-brett-kavanaugh-supre
me-court [https://perma.cc/7SAQ-W49P] (quoting Senator Jeff Flake stating his belief
“that the Constitution’s provisions of fairness and due process apply here” and citing a lack
of “corroborating evidence” in announcing his vote to confirm); see generally Wexler et al.,
supra note 10, at 66 (noting that Kavanaugh’s confirmation process “raised nearly every
variation of . . . due process concerns”). I will return to this erroneous conflation of crimi-
nal due process protections with those afforded to ordinary employees accused of miscon-
duct in Part I.B infra. For now, it is important to note that invocations of due process have
exceptional rhetorical force and can be used not only for political advantage but instru-
mentally to protect the powerful.
22. See Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18–22 (2018) [hereinafter Schultz,
Open Statement on Sexual Harassment] (“The problem with workplace harassment is sexism,
not sexual desire.”).
23. This phenomenon could be seen in the public’s outrage and subsequent backlash
over accusations by a pseudonymous woman that comedian and professed MeToo sup-
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ment in some respects, it is also one that poses risks. Certainly all
forms of sexual misconduct against women should incur public cen-
sure and meaningful consequences, but sexual harassment is a prob-
lem that goes beyond issues of unwanted physical contact or even
unwanted sexual attention. It reaches the core of how women are
treated at work and the degree to which they are able to realize their
full economic potential as equal citizens in the labor market.24 In
other words, the wrong of sexual harassment is that it discriminates
based on gender.
The popular conflation of sex and sexual harassment is partly a
semantic error. “Sex” can mean the act of sex or biological sex. Title
VII, the key federal statute prohibiting sexual harassment, contains
neither the words “sexual” nor “harassment.” The statute prohibits
discrimination “with respect to any individual[’s] . . . compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s . . . sex.”25 Sex in this context means gender. The theory of
porter Aziz Ansari pressured her to perform oral sex following a dinner date. See Katie Way,
I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari: It Turned into the Worst Night of My Life, BABE (2019), https:/
/babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355 [https://perma.cc/M42J-5WQB]. Cf. Bari Weiss,
Aziz Ansari is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind Reader, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/aziz-ansari-babe-sexual-harassment.html [https:/
/perma.cc/WJ8Y-CJDK] (opining that the accusations against Ansari reflected “deeply ret-
rograde ideas about what constitutes consent [and] sexual violence”) with Emma Gray, On
Aziz Ansari and Sex That Feels Violating Even When It’s Not Criminal, HUFFPOST (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/aziz-ansari-sex-violating-but-not-criminal_n_5a5e445de
4b0106b7f65b346?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/H77W-VK22] (viewing the Ansari inci-
dent as an opportunity “to renegotiate the sexual narratives we’ve long accepted [which
requires] having complicated conversations about sex that is violating but not criminal”).
See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, #MeToo: Why We Must Separate Sex from Sexual Harass-
ment, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/MeToo-
Why-we-must-separate-sex-from-sexual-12526498.php [https://perma.cc/2W2W-9WXM]
(critiquing the public discourse surrounding Ansari for failing to distinguish between accu-
sations of sexual harassment and non-consensual sex); Wexler et al., supra note 10, at
56–57 (viewing public debate over Ansari as a contest to define the scope of the
movement).
24. I refer to “women” throughout this Article for convenience, but that label should
be understood to mean both women and others targeted for adverse treatment based on
their gender or gender identity/performance. While the vast majority of victims are wo-
men, see Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, EEOC (last visited Oct. 10, 2019), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm [https://
perma.cc/E2U9-MKGF] (reporting that fewer than eighteen percent of sexual harassment
charges filed annually with the EEOC between 2010 and 2018 were filed by men), sexual
harassment can also target men and may target gay and gender non-conforming individu-
als of both sexes. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (recog-
nizing a claim for male-on-male sexual harassment); Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual
Harassment, supra note 22, at 25–28.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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liability for sexual harassment evolved from that language and it
gained traction—and ultimately judicial recognition—in situations in-
volving non-consensual sex or other forms of unwanted sexualized be-
havior.26 The paradigmatic sexual harassment scenario remains one
in which a woman is subjected to unwanted sexual attention or ac-
cedes to sexual demands tied to implicit, explicit, or perceived threats
of job repercussions by her boss.27
But a discriminatory work environment—one in which women
are routinely subjected to hostile treatment—can result equally from
non-sexualized acts of abuse that target on the basis of gender.28 Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the distinction and reveals the risks of equating sexual
harassment with sexual misconduct.
Figure 1
26. In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized a claim of “‘hostile environment’ sex
discrimination.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). The case in-
volved a bank teller who was repeatedly fondled, followed, and pressured for sex by her
supervisor, a bank vice-president, over the course of her four-year employment. Id. at 59.
The Court relied on the EEOC’s 1980 guidelines—the agency’s first attempt to address
sexual harassment—and the “terms and conditions” language of the statute. Id. at 63 (cit-
ing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). See gener-
ally Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 1 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegal eds., 2004) (discussing
evolution of sexual harassment as a theory of sex discrimination).
27. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 22, 30
(2018) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment] (noting that the “old or-
thodoxy” of sexual harassment as desire-based “still has cultural currency”).
28. See id. at 34–35; Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, supra note 22, at 20.
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This figure divides potentially objectionable employee conduct
into sexualized behavior on the left and expressions of power on the
right. Unlawful sexual harassment, represented by the gray-and-white-
striped circle in the center, can involve either or both. The MeToo
movement has focused almost exclusively on sexualized behavior that
would fall on the left side of this figure, while ignoring what is on the
right. There are two problems with this reductive understanding of
harassment. First, it leaves out expressions of power that, while not
sexualized, discriminate on the basis of gender. This form of harass-
ment, represented by the right side of Section A, may include patron-
izing behavior, abusive language, shunning, exclusion, pranks,
threats, endangerment, and even physical assault.29 It may be accom-
panied by explicit references to gender or trade on gender stereo-
types, or it may be gender-based only insofar as it exclusively targets
women. Its defining feature is that it reinforces traditional gender
roles and male privilege by isolating, undermining, and stigmatizing
those who threaten them.30
Second, but equally problematic, is the potential for overreach.
Not all sexualized behavior at work is unlawful. The United States Su-
preme Court has held that in order to be actionable under Title VII,
sexual harassment must be severe or pervasive, not merely unwel-
come.31 Sexualized conduct that meets this standard is represented by
the left side of Section A. A good deal of the harassment surfaced by
MeToo would easily fall into this category. This includes not only the
pattern of rape and sexual assault perpetrated by Weinstein, the move-
ment’s posterchild harasser,32 but also the conduct of many of
29. See Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, supra note 22, at 19; Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 27, at 31.
30. See Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, supra note 22, at 22; Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 27, at 28.
31. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67 (“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment.’”); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 83 (1998) (“The prohibition of harassment on the basis of
sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so
objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.”); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (noting that to constitute a Title VII violation, the
environment must “reasonably be perceived, and [be] perceived, as hostile or abusive”).
32. See Michael Gold, Harvey Weinstein is Accused of Sexually Assaulting a 16-Year-Old
Model, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/nyregion/harvey
-weinstein-sexual-assault-teenager.html [https://perma.cc/E93D-8ZYY] (reporting that
“[m]ore than 80 women have accused [Weinstein] of sexual harassment, including un-
wanted touching and pressure to perform sexual favors in return for parts” over a period of
decades). While Weinstein is arguably in a class of his own, others who have been accused
of equally serious crimes include Wynn, Russell Simons, and R. Kelly. See generally Alexan-
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MeToo’s “lesser” culprits whose repeated offensive acts and solicita-
tions, while not necessarily criminal or exclusively physical, could ob-
jectively result in an intolerable working environment.33
But the same cannot be said for all of the sexual conduct that has
come under the movement’s spotlight. Section B represents inappro-
priate sexualized behavior that falls outside the legal definition of har-
assment—what some have called “lawful but awful” sexual behavior.34
Conduct in this section could include an offensive but isolated inci-
dent of unwanted sexual attention or multiple instances of inappro-
priate but milder behavior, such as a pattern of sexual jokes or
banter.35 Section C represents behavior that is unobjectionable or
even, at times, desirable. This might include consensual interactions
or inoffensive acts or statements, such as non-pressured romantic
overtures between non-supervisory employees or situationally appro-
priate references to sex or sexuality.36 In the race to respond to
dra Berzon & Micah Maidenberg, Wynn Resorts Executives Ignored Sexual Misconduct Claims
Against Steve Wynn, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wynn-resorts-
to-settle-nevada-regulators-probe-11548711027 [https://perma.cc/J4AM-WSMJ] (noting
extensive reports of sexual harassment committed by Wynn over years); Harris, supra note
3 (detailing several counts of sexual abuse and other misconduct committed by R. Kelly
against minors); Melena Ryzik, Russell Simmons Faces New Rape Accusation in a First-Person
Account, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/arts/music/
russell-simmons-rape-accusation.html [ https://perma.cc/H86N-HNKY] (detailing several
rape and assault accusations against Mr. Simons).
33. This might include celebrity chef Mario Batali’s use of offensive language, grop-
ing, and other physically and verbally intimidating behavior, and news personality Charlie
Rose’s repeated solcitations and acts of physical exposure. See Julia Moskin, Mario Batali
Exits his Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/
dining/mario-batali-bastianich-restaurants.html [https://perma.cc/3ENL-TE9T]; Nathan-
iel Popper, CBS Settles with Women Who Accused Charlie Rose of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/business/cbs-settles-lawsuit-char
lie-rose.html [https://perma.cc/HB5X-C3CA].
34. Wexler et al., supra note 10, at 57.
35. Examples of behavior that would arguably fall within this category include retired
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski’s display of pornography on a work server, Denver Mayor John
Hancock’s sexually-tinged text messages to his female security detail, and former Arizona
Representative Trent Franks’ effort to induce a staffer to serve as a surrogate mother. See
Maura Dolan, 9th Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski Steps Down After Accusations of Sexual Misconduct,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-judge-alex-kozin
ski-20171218-story.html [https://perma.cc/F4DK-62U3]; Denver Mayor Michael Hancock’s
Sexual Harassment Accuser Says She Wants an Investigation, DENVER POST (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/18/michael-hancock-sexual-harassment-investiga
tion/ [https://perma.cc/6LXJ-F87U]; Katie Rogers, Trent Franks, Accused of Offering $5 Mil-
lion to Aide for Surrogacy, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/08/us/politics/trent-franks-sexual-surrogacy-harassment.html [https://perma.cc
/7AHH-UJRA].
36. See, e.g., Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (holding that
plaintiff-employee could not reasonably perceive as unlawful colleagues’ discussion of a
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MeToo, employers may react disproportionately to objectionable but
lawful behavior or unwittingly penalize behavior that is neither objec-
tionable nor unlawful.37
To be sure, neither victims nor employers should have to tolerate
inappropriate sexualized behavior in the workplace irrespective of the
law. The legal threshold for actionable harassment under Title VII is
high—arguably too high—and there is likely a subset of behavior
within Section B that ought to be deemed unlawful harassment.38 Ab-
sexual innuendo, found in a job application, that was reviewed in the course of employ-
ment); Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 225–26 (2006) (finding script
writer for adult-humored sitcom, “Friends,” had no congnizable claim of sexual harass-
ment stemming from sexual antics and coarse talk that occurred in connection with the
creative process).
37. See Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the MeToo Movement 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE
1014, 1014–15 (2018) (“[MeToo] allegations range from . . . rape or repeated forcible
touchings [to] . . . conduct reasonable people may consider ‘merely offensive’ . . . . Some
of these allegations involve conduct that federal law prohibits; other allegations, quite
frankly, do not.”). At least some MeToo reports have outed consensual relationships be-
tween managers and employees in ways that suggest these interactions are on par with
harassment. See, e.g., Alicia Ritcey, Intel’s Krzanich Will Relinquish $45 Million by Resigning as
CEO, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
21/intel-s-krzanich-to-relinquish-45-million-by-resigning-as-ceo [https://perma.cc/M23K-
G3JH]; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the ‘Father of
Android’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/
google-sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html [https://perma.cc/4WUB-9BMT]. See generally
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 11, at 2086–87 (discussing the risk and conse-
quent harms of employer condemnation of welcome sexualized behavior).
38. Many have condemned judicial interpretation of the severe or pervasive element
of sexual harassment for imposing an extraordinarily high bar to recovery. See, e.g., SANDRA
F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 151–57 (2017). In the wake of MeToo, at least two states have passed legislation
altering and eliminating the severe or pervasive requirement under state law, and more
may follow. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 524 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (West, Westlaw through L.2019 Ch. 360) (effective November
18, 2019). An open question is whether the MeToo movement will lead federal courts to
reconsider or update their application of that standard under Title VII. Some scholars
have suggested as much. See, e.g., L. Camille He´bert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a
Legal Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 326 (2018); Elizabeth C. Tippett,
The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 241–43 (2018); Rebecca
Hanner White, Title VII and the MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1014, 1015–16
(2018). It is also possible to see the MeToo movement as an attempt to address this defect
in the law through private social action. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo and Law’s
Limitations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2018, at A19 (characterizing MeToo as an “uprising of the
formerly disregarded” that has overcome the legal “logjam” of a system that perpetuates
the inequalities that sexual harassment law was designed to overcome); Melissa Murray,
Consequential Sex: #Metoo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. L. REV.
825, 868 (2018) (describing MeToo as an effort to “advance an alternative set of sexual
norms that sharply condemn and denounce harassment and assault” in the face of the
state’s “anemic response”). My focus in this Article, however, is on how the law is under-
stood and implemented by employers rather than judges. It is possible that employers are
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sent that normative justification, employers may have legitimate busi-
ness reasons for promptly addressing unprofessional and
inappropriate activity, whether to prevent it from ripening into sexual
harassment or simply to maintain decorum, productivity, and positive
morale. Employers may even have reasons for prohibiting otherwise
acceptable behavior within Section C, such as where a consensual rela-
tionship creates a conflict of interest or the risk or perception of un-
fair treatment.39
The issue is not whether employers should act on these concerns
but whether popular misconceptions, propagated and reified by
MeToo, will lead to unduly punitive responses. If employers lack an
understanding of the scope and the harm of sexual harassment they
are likely to be overzealous, as well as misdirected, in their response to
sexualized behavior.40
B. Due Who? The Non-Rights of At-Will Employees
A separate but compounding problem is the absence of any legal
backstop that could protect harassers. Just as public discourse reflects
a skewed perception of the scope of sexual harassment law, it also
overestimates the legal protections afforded to those accused.41 In
short, most accused harassers have no recourse against improvident
discipline or termination.
over-enforcing sexual harassment norms—in effect going too far—even while courts
under-enforce and do too little.
39. See Nancy Leong, Them Too, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 941 (forthcoming 2019) (arguing
that intimate relationships between individuals in disparate positions of power in work-
places and educational institutions should be barred regardless of consent in the interest
of protecting third parties).
40. Research on union grievances supports this conclusion. Studies show that union-
ized workers terminated or disciplined in situations involving alleged sexual harassment or
other sexual misconduct succeed in grieving their employers’ decisions at a rate of approx-
imately forty-five to fifty percent. See Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process, supra note 12, at
98; Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Respond-
ing to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517,
1538–39 (1999); Margaret A. Lucero et al., Protecting the Rights of Alleged Sexual Harassment
Perpetrators: Guidance from the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 16 EMP. RTS. & RESP. J. 71 (2004).
In other words, in nearly half of the arbitration awards studied, the employer’s disciplinary
response to employee sexual misconduct was determined to be excessive or unjustified.
41. Research suggests that workers generally overestimate the degree of legal protec-
tion they enjoy in their jobs, and that these misconceptions persist even when workers are
given information about the at-will nature of their employment. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining
With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the
Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 479–80 (1999).
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Discussion surrounding accused harassers has sounded lofty
themes such as due process and the presumption of innocence.42 Yet
such concepts operate solely in the sphere of governmental depriva-
tions of freedoms.43 In contrast, the animating principles governing
private workplace relationships are freedom of contract and employ-
ment at-will. In every state but one, private employers are presump-
tively entitled to terminate an employee for any reason or for no
reason, and they are permitted to exercise that discretion with or with-
out notice or process.44
The doctrine of employment at-will, combined with zealous anti-
harassment protocols, make for a dangerous mix when it comes to
accusations of sexual misconduct. Unfair outcomes can come at any
stage of an employer’s response. Figure 2 illustrates three scenarios
under which employers may act without “cause” when investigating
accusations of harassment.45
42. See supra notes 21–22.
43. See Clarke, supra note 20 (discussing public confusion regarding applicability of
due process principles and presumption of innocence); Wexler et al., supra note 10, at
66–67 (describing skepticism about the MeToo movement rooted in fear of false allega-
tions and disproportionate consequences); Lesley Wexler, #MeToo and Procedural Justice, 22
RICHMOND PUB. INT. L. REV. 13, 18 (2019) (asserting that traditional due process notions
are a poor fit for the MeToo context).
44. The exception is Montana. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (West, Westlaw
through chapters effective July 1, 2019 of the 2019 Sess.) (making involuntary discharge a
staturory violation where “the discharge was not for good cause”). All other states subscribe
to employment at-will. For background on the employment at-will doctrine and its con-
tested history, see generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law:
The Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1520–21
(2014) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law]; Richard A.
Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of
Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 456–60 (2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Develop-
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125–29 (1976).
45. The meaning of “cause” varies depending on context. See, e.g., Part II infra
(describing the use of idiosyncratic definitions of cause in executive employment agree-
ments). When considering application of the concept to rank-and-file employees, the un-
ionized workplace provides a useful analogy. In that context, “cause” to terminate or
discipline is often analyzed with reference to seven specific questions. See DISCIPLINE AND
DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 2-5 to 2-7 (Norman Brand & Melissa H. Brand eds., 3rd ed.
2014). The three columns in Figure 2 draw on what I have previously described as the
three basic areas of inquiry covered by these seven “tests.”See Arnow-Richman, Of Power and
Process, supra note 12, at 101–02. These areas of inquiry consist of: (1) questions about the
applicable rules (i.e., whether the grievant’s conduct violated the employer’s rules and
whether those rules were just and transparent), (2) questions about the employer’s pro-
cess, (i.e., whether the employer conducted a thorough and prompt investigation of the
alleged misconduct), and (3) questions about whether the employer’s responsive action
was proportionate to the grievant’s offense.
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Substantive Procedural Disciplinary
Rationale Dimensions Response
Scenario 1 BAD — —
Scenario 2 GOOD BAD —
Scenario 3 GOOD GOOD BAD
Figure 2
In Scenario 1, the employer acts without a justifiable substantive
basis, as where an employer disciplines or terminates a worker for per-
ceived unlawful behavior that is actually inoffensive or non-discrimina-
tory.46 In that situation, the employer, motivated by a skewed
understanding of sexual harassment, acts for a bad reason.
In Scenario 2, the employer has a more sophisticated understand-
ing of sexual harassment, but it can be mistaken about what occurred
as a factual matter. In a world where employers are not required to
provide workers with an opportunity to contest or appeal allegations
against them, an employer may act with legitimate concern about un-
lawful behavior, yet without sufficient proof as to whether the alleged
conduct occurred, who perpetrated it, and in what context. Such an
employer acts with good reason but through bad process.
Finally, in Scenario 3, an employer undertakes a fair process that
supports the culpability of the accused, but is immoderate in its re-
sponse. In an at-will employment regime, there is no requirement that
employers calibrate disciplinary action to the degree of misconduct.
The employer is free to terminate employees in the context of a first
time offense, or where the harassment could be cured through lesser
discipline. Such an employer acts with good reason, using good process,
but chooses a bad response.
So do accused harassers get due process? The question is replete
with irony: There is no due process in an at-will workplace. Since back-
ground law permits employers to terminate or discipline employees
for no reason and with no process, employers may a fortiori take those
actions for misguided reasons, relying on inadequate proof or poor
procedures.47 It is not harassers in particular who lack and require
due process; it is all employees.48
46. In other words, conduct that would fall within Sections B or C in Figure 1.
47. See Clarke, supra note 20, at 14 (“The argument that . . . those accused of sexual
misconduct should receive special procedural protection, while those accused of other
forms of misconduct do not, is a troubling form of exceptionalism.”).
48. The obvious implication is that all employees should receive some form of proce-
dural protection at work. See Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process, supra note 12, at 100 (“If
workers had greater job security and greater voice in determining their working condi-
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A deeper irony is that harassers may actually get more process than
those accused of other forms of workplace misconduct because em-
ployers gain a litigation advantage vis-a`-vis the harasser’s victim by in-
vestigating her complaint. Under the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth49 and Farragher v. Boca
Raton,50 employers can avoid hostile work environment liability by
showing they acted to prevent and correct sexual harassment.51 In
other words, when accused harassers are able to avail themselves of
internal processes to challenge the accusations against them or their
consequences, it is generally a byproduct of the employer’s efforts to
protect itself from legal liability to the victim.
Hence the final irony: Where private employers provide process
to the accused, it is, at best, a self-serving undertaking. At worst, it is
inherently biased. Terminating the accused is the ultimate evidence
that an employer took steps to end the harassment in satisfaction of
the corrective action element of the Ellerth/Farragher defense, even if
the harassment allegations are ultimately unsubstantiated.52 Employ-
ers score no points for exercising restraint in the face of uncertainty
about alleged harassment or for seeking to calibrate their response to
its severity. Indeed doing so may create a material issue of fact on the
adequacy of the employer’s response, precluding an award of sum-
mary judgment in its favor.53 In sum, there is no reason to expect
tions, they would be less vulnerable both to workplace harassment and to overzealous disci-
pline following harassment allegations.”); Clarke, supra note 20, at 30 (“The solution, for
those concerned about due process, is to extend some form of protection against arbitrary
terminations to all employees [as opposed to] carving out special protections against alle-
gations of a sexual nature.”). That claim, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. For
an argument that at-will employees should be entitled to advance notice of termination
and other procedural protections, see Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment
Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 467–78 (2016); Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment
Contract Law, supra note 44, at 1554–67.
49. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746 (1998).
50. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 779 (1998).
51. To succeed, employers must also prove that the victim failed to reasonably avail
herself of the employer’s process for resolving her complaint. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at
746; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 779.
52. See, e.g., Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1999)
(praising school district’s “vigorous” response to teacher’s allegation of harassment and
upholding summary judgment where district removed principal and accepted his resigna-
tion upon concluding that his conduct “could create the perception” of a hostile work
environment).
53. See, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2018) (re-
versing award of summary judgment because, although employer terminated harasser after
receiving formal notice of plaintiff’s complaint, it previously issued only verbal reprimands
and warnings of possible termination in response to harasser’s prior inappropriate behav-
ior with other employees); Hotchkiss v. CSK Auto Inc., 918 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1120 (E.D.
Issue 1] FINDING BALANCE IN THE METOO ERA 17
employers to safeguard the due process interests of the accused when
investigating sexual harassment and every reason to fear that some
accused harassers might be unfairly swept up in a rush to judgment.54
II. Or is MeToo Too Little?
This Article has suggested there is reason to be concerned about
overzealous discipline of alleged sexual harassers, at least with respect
to ordinary employees. However, MeToo has not focused on ordinary
employees. It has been trained almost exclusively on executives, own-
ers, moguls, and celebrities—the top dogs of the workplace. In con-
trast to the rank-and-file, who are often viewed as expendible, these
employees may be deemed too valuable to lose.55 They also enjoy ex-
tensive contractual protections against unjustified termination. Thus,
top dog harassers are likely to receive not just fair process, but undue
leniency when faced with sexual harassment accusations.
A brief description of the common features of executive contracts
illustrates why. Almost universally, high-level contracts override the de-
fault rule of employment at-will and provide the executive with a ro-
bust form of job security.56 Such contracts are usually structured as
fixed-term appointments, guaranteeing the executive a period of sev-
Wash. 2013) (noting that corrective action must be sufficient not only to dissuade the
harasser but also to dissuade others from similar conduct, and merely issuing a verbal
warning and reading a copy of the company’s sexual harassment policy was insufficient
corrective action). This is not to say that an employer can obtain summary judgment only
in cases of termination. To the contrary, courts routinely award summary judgment to
employers based on questionable demonstrations of preventive and corrective action. See
SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 38, at 19–23. The point rather is that promptly terminating
the accused harasser is clear evidence that the employer acted effectively to end the com-
plained of behavior.
54. Courts have made clear that to satisfy the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, em-
ployer investigations need only be reasonable and need not ensure “due process” for the
accused. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is nothing in [Faragher or Ellerth] requiring a company to conduct a
full-blown, due process, trial-type proceeding in response to complaints of sexual harass-
ment. All that is required of an investigation is reasonableness [which] may include con-
ducting the inquiry informally in a manner that will not unnecessarily disrupt the
company’s business, and in an effort to arrive at a reasonably fair estimate of truth.”).
55. See Clarke, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing the perception that certain “superstar”
employees are worth the cost of their misconduct); He´bert, supra note 38, at 324 (observ-
ing that prior to MeToo, “many companies saw the harms caused by sexual harassment as
not sufficient to counterbalance the benefits to those companies provided by the
harassers”).
56. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 246–48 (2006)
(finding that the “overwhelming bulk” of CEO contracts—340 out of a 375 contract sam-
ple—are “just cause” contracts).
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eral years of employment, subject to limited termination rights.57 Ter-
mination clauses generally give the employer a choice to terminate for
“cause” or for “no-cause,” albeit with serious financial consequences to
the company in the event of the latter.58 Contracts typically define
cause explicitly, usually in the form of a list of justifications that com-
prise the exclusive bases for a penalty-free termination prior to the
expiration of the contract.59 Within this structure, the no-cause provi-
sion operates as a type of liquidated damages clause in the event that
the employer terminates for a non-enumerated reason.60 Altogether,
the effect is to severely constrain the company’s discretion to termi-
nate, even in the face of possible misconduct.61
The contract of MeToo’s most infamous harasser offers a stark
example. Weinstein’s final contract with the Weinstein Company
Holdings granted him a three-year term from December 31, 2015,
through December 31, 2018, but permitted the company to terminate
him for cause at any time during the term.62 As to the meaning of
“cause,” the agreement provided:
For purposes of this Agreement, “[C]ause” shall mean only: (i) a
willful failure or refusal by you to follow [Board instructions] or
your knowingly taking any action [requiring Board approval] with-
out approval; (ii) the perpetuation by you of a material fraud
against the Company [determined through arbitration]; (iii) a
conviction for a felony involving fraud, dishonesty or moral turpi-
tude, after the exhaustion of all possible appeals; (iv) an indict-
ment for [such a felony] if it is determined by a vote of the majority
of the Board [including one Co-Chairman] to cause serious harm
to the Company; (v) a willful violation of the Code of Conduct if it
is determined by a vote of a majority of the Board [including one
Co-Chairman] that such violation has caused serious harm to the
Company; or (vi) a material breach by you of [this agreement] pro-
vided that, in the case of each of clauses (i), (v) and (vi) above, the
Board has first notified you in writing, within a reasonable time . . .
57. Id. at 247.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Cf. Ralph Weber, Severance Pay, Sales of Assets, and the Resolution Of Omitted Cases, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 593, 597 (1982) (suggesting that in ordinary employment relationships, an
employer’s severance plan “in essence serves as a liquidated damages clause, compensating
an employee for the breach of an agreement, implicit in the employment relationship, that
he will hold his job as long as he performs well”).
61. See generally Tippett, supra note 38, at 284–87 (asserting that such clauses create
uncertainty about whether sexual harassment qualifies as cause, leading employers to pay
partial or full severance to avoid a legal dispute).
62. Letter Agreement Between Weinstein Company Holdings and Harvey Weinstein,
para. 2, at 1, para. 14, at 12–13 (Oct. 20, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Wein-
stein Letter Agreement”].
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of such action or omission by you . . . and you have not cured the
particular action or omission complained of within thirty (30) days
. . . provided further . . . the payment by you of any costs incurred
by the Company as a result of a violation of [this agreement] shall
constitute a cure of such violations.63
In the event that the company chose to terminate Weinstein for one
of the enumerated reasons, the contract relieved it of any financial
obligations it would otherwise have owed over the remainder of the
term.
A close reading of the above definition of cause makes plain how
well-insulated top dog employees like Weinstein are against the risk of
termination for alleged sexual harassment or any other form of mis-
conduct. The clause begins by limiting the definition of cause to the
listed circumstances: these are the “only” meanings of that term, and
the clause contains no “catch-all” provision.64 The subparts describe
the exclusive grounds for terminating in narrow, precise terms.65
Some impose a scienter requirement. To constitute cause, a refusal to
follow orders or—of particular relevance to a potential termination
for sexual harassment—a violation of the company’s Code of Conduct
must be “willful.”66 Several subparts contain qualifying language re-
garding the severity of the underlying misconduct. Only “material”
breaches and specifically identified felonies constitute cause; lesser
crimes or other forms of misconduct do not justify a for-cause termi-
nation.67 Finally, Code of Conduct violations and felony indictments
are not grounds in themselves but must, respectively, “have caused” or
be “reasonably expected” to cause “serious harm” to the company.68
On top of these pro-employee substantive terms, the Weinstein
termination clause contains built-in procedural protections that fur-
ther limit employer discretion. In the event of an enumerated felony
conviction, the criminal appeals process provides the necessary review,
and the company is precluded from terminating for cause prior to the
employee’s exhaustion of all appeals.69 For wrongdoing not involving
a criminal conviction, the clause creates an internal system of em-
ployer accountability. Fraud against the company is determined
63. Id. para. 14, at 12–13.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. para. 14 (i), 14 (v), at 12–13.
67. Id. para. 14(iii), 14(vi), at 13.
68. Id. para. 14(iv), 14(v), at 13.
69. Id. para. 14(iii), at 13 (stating that the enumerated felonies are those involving
fraud, dishonesty, or moral turpitude).
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through private arbitration.70 Conduct causing “serious harm” to the
company is evaluated by the Board of Directors.71 A majority vote, in-
cluding at least one Co-Chairman, must find that the requisite degree
of harm (or, depending on which prong is at issue, potential for
harm) exists.72
Finally, the clause gives the employee the right to advance notice
and an opportunity to cure in situations involving neglect or deroga-
tion of board authority, Code of Conduct violations, or the material
breach of key provisions of the agreement.73 Upon discovering
grounds for termination under any of those subparts, the Board of
Directors must notify the employee “within a reasonable time . . . spec-
ifying in reasonable detail the facts supporting such determination.”74
The employee then has thirty days to correct the complained-of be-
havior.75 Perhaps most generous of all, the clause provides that the
executive’s reimbursement of costs incurred by the company as a re-
sult of a material breach “shall constitute a cure of such violations.”76
In short, the process of terminating a top dog harasser is a
minefield. From today’s vantage point, it may seem clear that Wein-
stein could have been terminated for cause under prong (v) of his
termination clause,77 but that determination would have been more
difficult prior to the watershed accusations that brought to light the
full extent of his misconduct and sent the company into bankruptcy.78
70. Id. para. 14(ii), at 13. The agreement appears to contain a drafting error on this
point. The relevant clause provided in full: “(ii) the perpetuation [sic] by you of a material
fraud against the Company is [sic] determined by final decision pursuant to Paragraph 25
[dealing with arbitration].” Presumably “is” in this clause should read “as,” or the word
“which” prior to “is” was omitted, otherwise the clause states how fraud is determined with-
out stating that fraud is a ground for termination. In addition, the drafters presumably
meant to write “perpetration” of a fraud, not “perpetuation.”
71. Id. para. 14(iv), 14(v), at 13.
72. Id. Achieving such a vote would be nothing short of miraculous as Harvey Wein-
stein was himself one of the two Co-Chairmen; the other was his brother, Robert Wein-
stein. See id. para. 2(a), at 1.
73. Id. para. 14(i), 14(v), 14(vi) at 12–13.
74. Id. para. 14(vi), at 13.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Despite currently being under indictment for several counts of rape and sexual
assault, Weinstein still could not be terminated under clause (iii) or (iv), dealing with
crimes of moral turpitude, insofar as the langauge of those clauses requires either a final
convinction or a specially constituted vote of the board. Id. para. 14(iii), 14(iv), at 13.
78. The Weinstein Company filed for bankruptcy in March 2018 following five
months of “turmoil” in the wake of Weinstein’s termination for sexual misconduct. See
Jonathan Randles, Weinstein Co. Files for Bankruptcy as Part of Deal With Lantern Capital, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weinstein-co-to-file-for-bankruptcy-as-
part-of-deal-with-lantern-capital-1521513365 [https://perma.cc/PM3A-WPQD].
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Plus, few harassers engage in conduct so extreme. A company faced
with less egregious misconduct, but constrained by a similar clause,
would have legitimate doubts as to whether it could lawfully terminate
the accused. Per the agreement, it would have to conclude not only
that the executive’s behavior violated the company’s Code of Con-
duct, but that it was committed willfully and caused serious harm to
the company. Conduct perpetrated by the executive under the mis-
taken, if naı¨ve, belief that it was inoffensive or somehow welcome to
the victim might not constitute a “willful” violation.79 Similarly, the
mere risk of sexual harassment liability or reputational damage might
not constitute serious harm to the company.80
If the company chose to terminate despite its uncertainty, it
would be risking a breach of contract action by the executive81—one
in which the company would likely bear the burden of proving the
termination was for cause.82 The company would have to weigh the
substantial costs of litigation against the uncertain prospect of success.
79. There does not appear to be reported caselaw interpreting the meaning of “will-
ful” in an executive employment contract. For purposes of determining the availability of
liquidated or punitive damages in connection with a statutory employment violation,
courts require conduct that is done with knowledge, malice, or reckless disregard. See, e.g.,
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a); Angela
A. Wortche, Defining Willfulness Under the ADEA, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 451 (1986) (claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
80. There are few reported decisions involving the interpretation of material harm in
executive contracts. Those that exist generally evaluate whether actual harm to the busi-
ness was serious enough to be material. See, e.g., Jones v. Hous. Auth. of Fulton Cty., 726
S.E.2d 484, 487–88 (Ga. App. 2012) (finding that CEO’s ratification of improper diversion
of federal funds caused material harm to the business constituting cause to terminate);
Lyons v. Midwest Glazing, 265 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1073–74 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (finding that
product manager’s negative attitude and poor morale infected employees and harmed the
business justifying termination). If actual financial damage is not necessarily sufficient to
constitute material harm in all cases, it seems unlikely that courts would treat the risk of
harm as material. Cf. Tippett, supra note 38, at 286 (speculating that harassment that has
not been publicly disclosed may not constitute “material damage” constituting cause).
81. Some high-profile coporate ousters have already spurred litigation. See Parneros v.
Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-07834, 2019 WL 4090620 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019) (for-
mer Barnes & Noble CEO initiated breach of contract suit against former employer); Tom
McParland, Ex-CBS Head Moonves to Fight for $120M Severance in Arbitration, AM. LAW. (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/2019/01/17/moonves-to-fight-for-120m-
severance-in-arbitration-with-cbs-407-4274/ [https://perma.cc/3LHX-UHFZ] (former CBS
CEO Moonves plans to invoke arbitration clause of his agreement to challenge denial of
severance pay).
82. Courts typically hold that an employer has the burden of proving cause when
terminating an employee under a for-cause employment contract. See, e.g., Ross v. Garner
Printing Co., 285 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2002); Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., 82 F.3d
1166, 1176–77 (1st Cir. 1996); Harig v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 166 F.Supp.3d 542, 550
(D. Md. 2015); New England Stone, LLC v. Conte, 962 A.2d 30, 33 (R.I. 2009); cf. Restate-
ment of Employment Law § 2.04, cmt. d (Am. Law. Inst. 2015) (opining that in definite
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Weinstein’s contract, like those of many executives, binds the parties
to private arbitration, and it places financial responsibility for that
process on the company, regardless of who invokes it.83 It also con-
tains a one-way fee-shifting provision in favor of Weinstein. In the
event that Weinstein prevails “on at least one material matter in dis-
pute,” the company must “pay all [of his] fees and expenses,” includ-
ing his attorneys’ fees.84 This could mean that even if the company
succeeded in establishing cause to terminate, Weinstein could still
recoup his fees were he to prevail on another disputed issue, such as
the scope of his indeminification rights or his entitlement to past com-
pensation.85 There is no parallel provision shifting the company’s fees
and costs to Weinstein in the event of an employer victory.
In sum, when it comes to accusations of harassment, the respec-
tive positions of top dogs and the rank-and-file could not be further
apart. Whereas at-will employees have almost no protection against a
mistaken or overzealous act of discipline or termination, the top dogs
of the workplace are, for practical purposes, almost immune from any
adverse action. Public concern about so-called due process for ac-
cused harassers is legitimate, but has been misplaced.86 We need not
be concerned about the high-profile harassers toppled by the MeToo
movement; but we should be concerned about the possible ripple ef-
fects on ordinary employees.
III. Finding Balance, Forging a Legacy
How then should we move forward in establishing protocols re-
garding accused harassers? And how can we ensure a positive long-
term legacy for the MeToo movement? Part of the answer lies in pro-
term contracts, the better understanding is that employers must have proof of actual cause
and may not justify termination based on a reasonable belief that cause existed).
83. Weinstein Letter Agreement, supra note 62, para. 25, at 16 (“Each party shall pay
the fees of their respective attorneys . . . , the expenses of their witnesses, and all other
expenses connected with presenting their Claims or defense(s) . . . . Other costs of arbitra-
tion shall be borne by the Company.”).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. In this way, the agreement prevents a judicial interpretation of the meaning of
“prevailing party” that could lead to a reduction or denial of fees were Weinstein to sue but
achieve mixed results. See generally John R. Schleppenbach, Winning the Battle but Losing the
War: Towards a More Consistent Approach to Prevailing Party Fee Shifting In The Contractual
Context, 12 FLA. A. & M. U. L. REV. 185, 198–209 (2017) (discussing absence of caselaw and
common applications of judicial discretion in interpreting and applying fee-shifting
clauses).
86. See Clarke, supra note 20, at 18–27 (arguing that high-level harassers have been
fairly treated from an “extralegal” process perspective).
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moting a better understanding of sexual harassment itself, but it is
also important to bear in mind the lack of workers’ rights more gener-
ally. There are neither public mandates requiring employers to han-
dle rank-and-file employees fairly, nor any laws limiting the
contractual protections afforded to top dogs. Because of this, much
will depend on voluntary employer action. Forging a legacy requires
advocates to harness employer good will and maintain the current de-
mand for institutional accountability.
A. Toward Best (Better?) Practices
Employers and their lawyers are working to establish best prac-
tices for preventing and responding to sexual harassment.87 Protocols
for handling accused harassers should be part of that effort, but they
must be approached cautiously and conscientiously. This Part offers
preliminary thoughts on employer efforts that might limit the risks of
both over- and under-enforcement.
1. Education and Moderation
To ensure fair treatment of rank-and-file employees accused of
harassment, employers must do two things: educate and moderate.
Educating means undertaking the necessary teaching and learning to
fully understand sexual harassment: its scope, its limits, the nature of
the harm, and its relationship to gender discrimination. Moderating
means responding to sexual harassment in a manner reflective of that
understanding and, as with any inappropriate behavior, proportionate
to the conduct in question.
When faced with allegations of sexual harassment, employers, act-
ing through their human resources professionals or other managers,
will generally initiate an investigation. This makes sense as a compli-
ance matter—employers must act to redress complaints of discrimina-
tion in order to avoid liability to the victim—and a fair and thorough
investigation is also a critical part of ensuring some form of “due pro-
cess” for the accused. But investigators must know what they are inves-
tigating and why. Too often the process of investigating a complaint is
87. Legal news outlets and human resources sites are flush with commentary by man-
agement-side counsel explaining how best to respond to the movement. See, e.g, Nancy
Saperstone & Rebecca Blake, Addressing #MeToo in the Workplace and HR’s Response,
WORKFORCE (May 21, 2018), https://www.workforce.com/2018/05/21/addressing-metoo-
workplace-hrs-response/ [https://perma.cc/D46N-2KDD]; David Weiss & Matt Pur-
due,The Need For New Legal And PR Strategies In The #MeToo Era, LAW360 (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1147188/the-need-for-new-legal-and-pr-strategies-in-the-
metoo-era [https://perma.cc/WPK5-CDRJ].
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seen purely as a quest for factual truth, one that will get to the bottom
of the proverbial “he-said-she-said” problem. Contrary to popular be-
lief, however, the greater challenge lies not in determining what oc-
curred, but in choosing the appropriate response.88
Attention to nuance and context is important. As discussed in
Part I, not every sexual joke, innuendo, or even sexual overture is nec-
essarily sexual harassment.89 Employers who focus only on those types
of interactions are unlikely to identify non-sexualized harassment or
uncover broader patterns of discriminatory behavior within the work-
place.90 Employers should consider whether complained-of behavior
is harmful and offensive based on gender, and whether it—along with
other inappropriate behavior—undermines women’s ability to access
workplace opportunities, flourish in their positions, and realize their
long-term career goals.
Employers can take concrete steps toward achieving this under-
standing by tapping into sources other than their “go-to” management
law firms. Academics from many disciplines—sociology, psychology,
gender studies, and of course law—have much to contribute to educa-
tion and training. Legal scholars have already published articles and
other materials that can further employers’ understanding of sexual
harassment.91 A dialogue among corporate decision-makers, their
counsel, human resources professionals, and engaged academics can
do much to help employers identify and correct the full range of po-
tentially harassing behavior.
In the event that an informed investigation into accusations of
harassment uncovers sanctionable conduct, the punishment must fit
the crime. Not every inappropriate act requires termination, even if it
88. Cf. Tippett, supra note 38, at 276 (“Employers are quite capable at getting to the
bottom of the factual issues and can do so quite efficiently.”).
89. See Part I.A infra.
90. See Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128
YALE L.J. F. 152, 159–65 (2018) (describing how judicial focus on particular perpetrators
vis-a`-vis complaining victims tends to disregard the contributing behavior of other employ-
ees as well as the effects on other potential victims); Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Har-
assment, supra note 22, at 44–45 (noting that ridding the workplace of individual harassers
“one by one” will not “prevent similar harassment from recurring in the future” because
“[e]ventually, other harassers will take their place”).
91. See, e.g., Tippett, supra note 38, at 299–302 (providing a model harassment and
discrimination policy) Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, supra note 22 (identify-
ing ten principles for addressing sexual harassment and providing related reform propos-
als). Additional documents prepared for this purpose by the Author can be found at
https://www.law.du.edu/about/people/rachel-arnow-richman [https://perma.cc/WUG9-
LMU7].
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could rise to the level of sexual harassment.92 Employers should treat
sanctionable conduct as they would other forms of unlawful behavior
or serious workplace misconduct, applying informal systems of pro-
gressive discipline to ensure a calibrated response. In unionized work-
places, where rank-and-file employees enjoy contractual protection
against arbitrary termination, employers meting out discipline must
consider how other workers have been treated for similarly egregious
behavior.93 Non-unionized employers should do this as well. The com-
parators need not be other sexual harassers. Employers can bench-
mark their disciplinary response against past treatment of workers
accused of other forms of discrimination. They can also rely on their
past responses to other types of wrongful behavior or policy violations,
such as engaging in nepotism, disclosing confidential information,
flouting conflicts of interest rules, or retaliating against employees
based on their speech or whistleblowing activity.
Finally, employers should take care to look beyond the individual
accused when considering appropriate responsive action. Employers
should not make an example of one employee, neglecting to consider
the institutional choices that may have set the stage for harassing be-
havior.94 Gender-segregated jobs, the absence of women in leader-
ship, exclusively male networks of control, and a work culture that
tolerates abuses of power all perpetuate stereotypes and normalize
harassment.95 It is neither fair to the accused, nor a solution to the
problem, to condemn a single bad actor when the structure of institu-
tion is equally if not principally to blame.
2. Contracting with Potential Harassers
When it comes to top dogs, the opposite is required: Employers
need to ratchet up a notch, starting with how they draft and negotiate
executive contracts. Definitions of cause should preserve employer
flexibility to terminate in the event of conduct that could reasonably
be perceived as sexual harassment. This can be done by explicitly list-
92. See He´bert, supra note 38, at 332–33 (“Views about the appropriate disciplinary or
other actions to be taken in response to sexual misconduct by a misguided romantic suitor
may differ substantially than what might be viewed as appropriate action to take against a
serial predator.”).
93. See DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION, supra note 45 (describing the “non-
discrimination” test of just cause in which the aribrator asks whether “the employer [has]
applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly . . . to all employees”).
94. See Green, supra note 90, at 166 (arguing that “a story that fails to see the ways in
which harassment ties to broader work environments . . . leads to overly narrow calls for
reform”).
95. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 27, at 48.
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ing sexual harassment as grounds for cause.96 It can also be done by
removing qualifying language that limits the employer’s ability to ter-
minate for policy violations or contract breaches absent serious harm
or intentional conduct.97 Depending on the structure of the contract,
both types of changes may be required.98 Whatever drafting conven-
tions ultimately develop, the goal must be to enable companies to ter-
minate top dogs for conduct that either alone, or in combination with
similar conduct, could create a hostile work environment based on
gender.99
Broadening definitions of cause however, is merely a first step.
Other common provisions of executive contracts are similarly in need
of reform. Fine systems or other paths for “curing” misconduct that
replenish the institutional coffers without redressing the harm or en-
suring future compliance should be eliminated.100 The same should
be done with broad indemnification clauses that protect executives
from personal liability in the event they are sued for wrongful
conduct.
For instance, Weinstein’s contract provides:
You [Weinstein] will be fully indemnified and held harmless by the
Company to the fullest extent permitted by law from any claim,
liability, loss, cost or expense of any nature (including attorney’s
fees . . . ) incurred by you . . . which arises, directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part out of any alleged or actual conduct, action or
inaction on your part in or in connection with or related in any
manner to your status as an employee, agent, officer, corporate di-
rector, member, manager, shareholder, partner of . . . the Com-
96. See, e.g., Letter Agreement Between CBS Corp. and Leslie Moonves, para.
10(a)(vi), at 23 (Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Moonves Letter Agree-
ment”] (listing as grounds for termination “your willful and material violation of any policy
of the Company . . . including, but not limited to, policies concerning . . . sexual harass-
ment”) (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Letter Agreement Between Barnes & Noble and Demos Parneros, para.
2(c)(i)(E), at 2 (Nov. 17, 2016) (on file with author) (including as a basis for cause to
terminate “your material breach of this Agreement or of any other contractual duty to,
written policy of, or written agreement with the Company”).
98. For instance, the effectiveness of a clause in CBS’s and Les Moonves’ agreement,
explicitly identifying violations of the company’s sexual harassment policy as cause for ter-
mination, is diminished by qualifying language that such violations must be “willful.”
Moonves Letter Agreement, supra note 96, para 10(a)(vi), at 23.
99. See Tippett, supra note 38, at 287 (predicting broader definitions of cause in exec-
utive agreements post-MeToo).
100. See, e.g., Weinstein Letter Agreement, supra note 62, para. 14(vi), at 13; supra Part
II; see generally Tippett, supra note 38, at 286–87 (critiquing such clauses for enabling execu-
tives to avoid or dispute termination through promises of corrected behavior and future
compliance).
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pany . . . unless such claim, liability, loss, cost or expense is a result
of you not acting in good faith on behalf of the Company . . . . 101
In other words, the company must reimburse Weinstein for any loss
he incurs while acting in any capacity on behalf of the company, con-
ceivably including liability in connection with sexual harassment.102
To be sure, Weinstein’s indemnification clause does not apply to
losses resulting from a failure to act in good faith, which would appear
on its face to preclude indeminification in connection with many of
his actions.103 Yet the power of that exception is significantly dimin-
ished by subsequent language granting Weinstein the benefit of the
doubt:
You shall be entitled to a presumption that you acted in good faith.
To the maximum extent allowed by law, all amounts to be indem-
nified hereunder including reasonable attorneys’ fees shall be
promptly advanced by the Company until such time, if ever, as it is
determined by final decision pursuant to [the dispute resolution
clause] below that you are not entitled to indemnification hereun-
der (whereupon you shall reimburse the Company for all sums
theretofore advanced).104
Under this clause, a presumption of good faith, along with the
obligation to front Weinstein’s attorney’s fees, attaches automatically.
It is only at some uncertain point in the future that the company may
be able to recover those costs should it choose to initiate and pay for
private arbitration pursuant to the contract’s dispute resolution provi-
sion.105 In short, not only are companies unable to freely terminate
executives for their misconduct, in many situations they also have to
pay for the resulting damage.
Assuming employers change the way they draft top dog contracts,
they will next need to reconsider how they enforce them. Broader def-
initions of cause and other adjustments to standard language can give
companies more leeway to terminate top dog harassers, but corporate
boards must be willing to use it. Boards of directors are often reluc-
101. Weinstein Letter Agreement, supra note 62, para. 7, at 4–5.
102. Federal law does not impose personal liability on harassers, but many state anti-
discrimination laws do. See generally Shannon Clark Kief, Individual Liability of Supervisors,
Managers, Officers or Co-employees for Discriminatory Actions Under State Civil Rights Act, 83
A.L.R. 5th 1 (2000). In addition, various intentional tort claims could be pursued against
an individual defendant in connection with harassing behavior, such as battery, false im-
prisonment, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Reeves v. Hologram,
No. BC643099 (Cal. Dec. 7, 2016). See generally WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW, 16-1 to 16-7
(Gilbert F. Casellas & Diane M. Soubly eds., 2d ed., 2018).
103. Weinstein Letter Agreement, supra note 62, para. 7, at 4–5.
104. Id. para. 7, at 5 (emphasis added).
105. Id. para. 25, at 16–17.
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tant to exercise for-cause termination clauses even if they have a credi-
ble basis for doing so. The directors may prefer to maintain positive
relationships (and sometimes ongoing business connections) with the
departing executive, or they may fear terminating for cause will jeop-
ardize their company’s reputation in the market for their next hire.106
Google’s infamous treatment of Android founder, Andy Rubin, offers
a seminal example. According to media reports last year, Rubin left
Google in 2014 with $90 million in severance despite credible accusa-
tions that he forced a subordinate to perform oral sex in a hotel
room.107
Instead of this lenient treatment, corporate boards must be will-
ing to exercise their power. CBS’s ouster of CEO Les Moonves offers a
rare but welcome example. In September 2018, the network an-
nounced that Moonves would be terminated without severance follow-
ing revelations that he had engaged in acts of bodily exposure,
physical violence, intimidation, and retaliation.108 The company com-
mitted $20 million of what it would have paid Moonves in severence to
organizations supporting the MeToo movement.109 That is not to say
that CBS’s motives were purely altruistic. Board decisions about how
and under what circumstances to separate top dogs from the company
are always complex.110 However, CBS’s willingness to terminate Moon-
106. This problem was made infamous by the 2005 shareholder derivate action
brought against the Walt Disney Company in connection with the costly “no cause” termi-
nation of CEO Michael Ovitz. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). That litigation challenged the board’s $140
million payout to Michael Ovitz after his brief and stormy tenure as CEO, arguing that it
breached the board’s fiduciary duty to the company. For background on the case, see gener-
ally Holger Spamann, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 923
(2006) (analyzing the court’s conclusion that none of the officers or directors of the Walt
Disney Company breached their fiduciary duties).
107. Google subsequently invested in the venture firm that Rubin founded after exit-
ing the company. Wakabayashi & Benner, supra note 37.
108. CBS Corporation and National Amusements Announce Resolution of Governance Disputes
and Transition to New Leadership, CBS CORP. (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.cbscorporation.
com/cbs-corporation-and-national-amusements-announce-resolution-of-governance-dis
putes-and-transition-to-new-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/ECW4-JR35]; Rachel Abrams &
David Enrich, ‘Transaction’ Sex and a Secret Resignation Letter: Takeaways from a Report on Les
Moonves, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/business/les-
moonves-cbs-report-takeaways.html [https://perma.cc/S5B8-G4GB].
109. Meg James & David Ng, CBS Picks Groups to Get $20 Million for #MeToo Causes, Taken
from Les Moonves’ Severance, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/
hollywood/la-fi-ct-cbs-metoo-money-moonves-20181214-story.html [https://perma.cc/
5TW6-WTJD]. Wynn was also separated without severance, albeit without the mammoth
donation and consequently with less fanfare. Kirkham et al., supra note 10.
110. The departure of Moonves and his board allies was part of a deal that ended
shareholder litigation challenging controlling shareholder Shari Redstone amidst a dis-
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ves publicly provides a model of what we might hope for from compa-
nies in the future.111
B. Leveraging Law and Public Sentiment
That, of course, is the crucial question: Can we expect employers
in the wake of MeToo to do a better job aligning their treatment of
accused harassers with the goals of anti-discrimination law? Or will
companies revert to business-as-usual once public attention to sexual
harassment dissipates?112
I am reasonably optimistic that companies will do more to police
sexual harassment and misconduct by top dog executives going for-
ward. This is partly because of public outrage over examples like
Google’s Andy Rubin are being subverted into legal action. Earlier
this year, Google shareholders filed several lawsuits alleging that the
company’s failure to redress sexual harassment by corporate bigwigs
affected its share value and harmed investors.113 Similar lawsuits were
filed against Wynn Resorts following allegations of rampant sexual
misconduct by disgraced CEO Steve Wynn.114 A suit brought against
Fox News in connection with the secret settlement of harassment
pute over a proposed merger with Viacom. Joe Flint, Suit Accuses Current, Former CBS Execu-
tives of Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/suit-
accuses-current-former-cbs-executives-of-insider-trading-11550016859 [https://perma.cc/
88Y6-H687]. Thus, the company stood to gain from Moonves’s departure irrespective of
the allegations. To root out top dog harassment, companies must be willing to fire for
cause, regardless of the relational or business context. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman,
CBS CEO Moonves’ Ouster is a Too Rare Case, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.sf
chronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/CBS-CEO-Moonves-ouster-is-a-too-rare-case-
13238793.php [https://perma.cc/U28L-MPGJ] (“If #Metoo is to have lasting impact, com-
panies must take a hard line against high-level harassment, not just when it aligns with
their other interests.”).
111. See generally Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate
Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1662 (2018) (recommending companies consider terminat-
ing CEOs for sexual misconduct, noting that “the damage to a firm’s value from losing an
iconic CEO may be far less than the reputational consequences of a high-profile sexual
harassment scandal”).
112. See He´bert, supra note 38, at 323 (noting that “[p]rior incidents in which sexual
harassment has grabbed the national attention . . . have arguably not had staying power”).
113. In Re Alphabet, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., Docket No.19CV341522 (Cal.
Jan. 10, 2019) (consolidated suit); see generally Mark Bergen et al., Google Board Sued for
Hushing Claims of Executive Misconduct, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2019-01-10/google-board-sued-for-hushing-misconduct-claims-
against-rubin [https://perma.cc/NQ2B-XQ5N].
114. Ferris v. Wynn Resorts Ltd., No. 2:18-CV-00479, 2018 WL 6411351 (D. Nev. Dec. 4,
2018); DiNapoli v. Wynn, Docket, No. A-18-770013-B (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2018) (judgment
rendered following settlement). For background on this litigation see Hemel & Lund, supra
note 111, at 1625–26.
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claims against News Chair Roger Ailes and Anchor Bill O’Reilly ended
in a $90 million court-approved settlement in April 2019.115 Experts
predict there is more litigation on the horizon.116
Of course, it is by no means clear that shareholder suits can suc-
ceed in establishing corporate liability. The law of corporate obliga-
tions defers heavily to the judgment of the company’s directors, and
there are procedural as well as substantive obstacles to such claims.117
Even so, the initiation of shareholder litigation can exert a powerful
force on companies as the multimillion-dollar settlement against Fox
News suggests.118 Nor are derivative suits the only sources of exposure.
Fox News’s harassment settlements also drew the attention of the New
York United States Attorney General’s Office, which in 2017 launched
an investigation into possible securities violations based on the com-
pany’s failure to disclose those payments to investors.119 Wynn Resorts
was brought up on charges before the Nevada Gaming Commis-
sion.120 The company was forced to pay a $20 million fine for turning
a blind eye to Wynn’s decades-long pattern of sexual misconduct.121
Faced with the prospect of litigation, companies and their lawyers
will inevitably respond. There is anecdotal evidence that corporate
lawyers are now accounting for the risk of a sexual harassment scandal
115. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 111, at 1621–23 (discussing Fox litigation); Emily
Steel, Fox Establishes Workplace Culture Panel After Harassment Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/media/fox-news-sexual-harass
ment.html [https://perma.cc/7LE2-Y56S] (reporting on settlement).
116. See generally Dunstan Prial, Attorneys Predict Wave Of #MeToo Investor Suits, LAW360
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1012534/print?section=assetmanage
ment [https://perma.cc/M24F-Q5LF] (suggesting the Wynn Resorts litigation “could be
the tip of the iceberg for companies [and is] an inevitable consequence of shifting cultural
priorities”); Hemel & Lund, supra note 111, at 1612–27 (discussing recent and past share-
holder lawsuits arising out of sexual harassment and misconduct).
117. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 111, at 1628 (describing applicable legal framework
and circumstances under which shareholders are most likely to prevail).
118. See id.; Prial, supra note 116 (predicting greater settlement value for such cases
despite legal challenges).
119. See Emily Steel & John Koblin, Fox News’ Harassment Payments are Under Investiga-
tion, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/busi
ness/media/fox-news-sexual-harassment-payments.html [https://perma.cc/J8H6-DJ6Q].
120. Tiffany Hsu, Wynn Resorts Fined $20 Million over Handling of Steve Wynn Misconduct
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/business/wynn
-vegas-nevada-gaming-commission.html [https://perma.cc/FF6K-55HL].
121. Id. Both the Nevada Commission and a subsequent investigation by Massachusetts
regulators found that numerous high-ranking individuals within the company, including
the CEO and several former general counsel, knew about Wynn’s behavior and failed to
act. O’Keeffe & Berzon, supra note 15; Berzon & Maidenberg, supra note 32.
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in drafting mergers and acquisition agreements.122 One can envision
executive employment contracts undergoing a similar change, grant-
ing companies more robust termination rights in the event of the ex-
ecutive’s wrongful behavior.123 Once drafting conventions develop,
they tend to endure.124 In the long run, this may translate into better
policing of high-level harassment overall, as well as less generous
terms of exit for perpetrators.
I am somewhat less sanguine about what will happen to rank-and-
file employees accused of harassment. Decisions regarding these work-
ers happen entirely outside the public spotlight and are ordinarily not
subject to any form of legal review. Adding to the problem, many legal
reforms that would incentivize companies to take harassment seri-
ously—for instance, lifting damage caps on victims’ claims125—may in-
spire even more aggressive investigations and discipline against the
accused. A roll back of the Ellerth/Farragher defense to hostile work
environment liability, however, could be an exception. Scholars and
advocates have long lambasted this defense for fomenting a culture of
“file cabinet compliance” that gives employers a false sense of comfort
and unwarranted liability protection.126 As discussed previously, the
122. See Chelsea Naso, #MeToo Movement Molds New Protections in Mergers, LAW360 (Jan.
18, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1119874/-metoo-movement-molds-new-pro
tections-in-mergers [https://perma.cc/Y28P-SHZN].
123. I am currently undertaking an empirical study of CEO contracts pre- and post-
MeToo that will determine the degree to which termination and other pro-employee
clauses change. See Rachel Arnow-Richman & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Anticipating Har-
assment: The Changing Norms of Executive Contracts Post-MeToo (forthcoming 2020).
124. The concept of “sticky boilerplate” has been used to explain why drafters persist
in using standard clauses that do not serve their purposes, debunking the formal law and
economics view that standard forms are efficient. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE
THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DE-
SIGN 10–11 (2013). For a useful taxonomy of the biases and externalities that underlie
contract “stickiness,” see Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration
Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 977
(2014).
125. See, e.g., Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, supra note 22, at 47 (urging
Congress to remove Title VII damages caps to enable low-wage victims to obtain attorneys).
126. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirma-
tive Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce
of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of
Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1
(2001) (arguing that to avoid liability employers should be required to demonstrate the
effectiveness of their harassment education and prevention programs rather than their
mere existence); Susan D. Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A
Proposal for Further Development of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Cases, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 85 (2006) (arguing that judicial applica-
tions of Ellerth and Faragher have contravened the policy underlying the affirmative defense
and advocating for vicarious liability whenever a harasser abuses power conferred by his
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defense also gives employers an incentive to penalize harshly.127 Over-
ruling this caselaw would be a rare change that could benefit both
victims and those accused.
As for incentivizing voluntary reform, there is a promising recent
increase in employee-concerted activity responding to MeToo. On No-
vember 1, 2018, 20,000 Google employees abandoned their desks in
fifty cities across the globe in the “Walkout for Real Change Move-
ment.”128 The demonstration was triggered by media reports of Andy
Rubin’s outlandish severance package and company efforts to shield
other top dog employees from sexual harassment allegations.129 But
the movement was actually a culmination of long-brewing employee
grievances reaching beyond issues of sexual harassment or even gen-
der equity. The Andy Rubin story broke during a time of escalating
internal tension over Google’s work on a censorship-compatible
search engine for the Chinese government.130 That same year the
company ditched its bid to secure a military contract with the Penta-
gon amidst strong employee backlash.131
That context reveals the potential for broader workplace reform
achieved through MeToo-inspired organizing.132 In addition to im-
proved sexual harassment procedures and other changes to advance
gender equity, the Walkout for Real Change Movement demanded
wide-reaching reforms aimed at leveling the corporate playing
employer); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 3 (2003) (arguing that Ellerth/
Faraher represents a “victory for a misguided culture of compliance, one in which liability is
measured not by whether employers successfully prevent harassment, but instead by
whether they comply with judicially created prophylactic rules” and advocating for Con-
gressional overruling of the affirmative defense in favor of automatic liability).
127. See Part I.B infra.
128. See Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest Over Handling
of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/
technology/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/F9VU-7EQ8].
129. See id.
130. See Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest Secret Work on Cen-
sored Search Engine for China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
08/16/technology/google-employees-protest-search-censored-china.html?module=inline
[https://perma.cc/5J97-W6QE].
131. See Drew Harwell, Google to Drop Pentagon AI Contract After Employee Objections to the
‘Business of War’, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/06/01/google-to-drop-pentagon-ai-contract-after-employees-called-it-the-
business-of-war/?utm_term=.F73443622b6a [https://perma.cc/GD7Z-Q9MT].
132. I refer here to informal grassroots organizing by employees rather than traditional
union organizing. For a thoughtful discussion of how and why labor unions should take a
role in ensuring workers’ freedom from harassment, see generally Marion Crain & Ken Ma-
theny, Sexual Harassment and Solidarity, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56 (2019).
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field.133 These included the elevation of the company’s diversity of-
ficer to the C-suite level; an end to forced arbitration agreements;
and, boldest of all, an employee representative on the company’s
Board of Directors.134 Google responded, at least in part. Days after
the protest, it publicly renounced its reliance on private arbitration
for harassment claims and later, in response to continued employee
pressure, the use of arbitration agreements altogether.135 Google’s
move spurred other tech giants to reevaluate their own arbitration
practices.136 Google has also promulgated numerous changes to its
sexual harassment and Equal Employment Opportunity practices and
made repeated public statements of commitment to working with em-
ployees toward additional reforms.137
Other demands have yet to be addressed, and the movement con-
tinues its work.138 What is promising and inspiring, however, is that
workers have connected sexual harassment and the special treatment
of corporate darlings to matters of employee input and voice in corpo-
rate decision making and to a concern with workers’ rights writ
large.139 If MeToo leads workers to demand and ultimately secure
some of these desired changes, one might hope that the rising tide
will lift all boats.
133. Some of these reforms include a revamped complaint system and sexual harass-
ment “transparency report.” See Claire Stapleton et al., We’re the Organizers of the Google Walk-
out. Here Are Our Demands, CUT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/google-
walkout-organizers-explain-demands.html [https://perma.cc/A9CP-QEBH].
134. Id.
135. See Conger & Wakabayashi, supra note 7; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Ends Forced
Arbitration for All Employee Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/02/21/technology/google-forced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/7SD4-8P5M].
136. See Wakabayashi & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 8.
137. See Conger & Wakabayshi, supra note 7; Jillian D’Onfro, A Post-Walkout Google Goes
Public with Updated Harassment and Discrimination Policies, Promises to ‘Listen’, FORBES (Apr.
25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/04/25/a-post-walkout-
google-goes-public-with-updated-harassment-and-discrimination-policies-promises-to-listen
/#17ed09e076b1 [https://perma.cc/G9BC-LXAK].
138. See Suhauna Hussain, Google Workers Protest ‘Culture of Retaliation’ with Sit-In, L.A.
TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-google-walkout-protest-re
taliation-20190501-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9G6-2DAR] (reporting on employee
concerted activity since the November 1, 2018 walkout, including a May Day 2019 protest
against retaliation). The movement maintains a Twitter feed.
139. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 132, at 112–22 (connecting the goals of the
MeToo movement with interests in worker safety and job security that traditionally have
been the subject of collective bargaining).
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Conclusion
Eradicating workplace sexual harassment is an imperative and a
challenge. So too is treating workers fairly at all levels of the organiza-
tion. This Article has focused on one aspect of the emerging response
to MeToo—developing best practices for handling accused harassers.
The movement’s principal focus has been and should continue to be
vindicating the rights of victims and preventing future harm. Yet the
ways in which employers treat accused harassers—the extent to which
they choose to enforce their policies and against whom—tell us a
great deal about what we can expect the movement to accomplish.
Whether employers are motivated to protect their brand, appease
their workforce, avoid liability, or are genuinely inspired to forge a
more just and diverse workplace, they will be a powerful force in shap-
ing the legacy of MeToo. As those of us who advocate for victims seek
to influence, assess, and at times counteract their choices, we should
take care to remember: Not all harassers are created equal.
